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HINDSIGHT BIAS AND TORT LIABILITY:
Avoiding Premature Conclusions
Philip G. Peters, Jr.*
Cognitive psychologists know that *judgments made in hindsight are
distorted by two cognitive heuristics-hindsight bias and outcome bias.
Hindsight bias makes bad outcomes seem more predictable in hindsight than
they were ex ante.' Outcome bias induces us to assume that people who
cause accidents have been careless. 2 Because of these biases, individuals
who know that a bad outcome has occurred tend to evaluate prior conduct
more harshly than they would if they were unaware of the actual outcome.
In negligence actions, defendants are supposed to be judged by the
reasonableness of their conduct, not by its outcome. Jurors are asked to put
themselves in the shoes of the defendant at the time of the challenged
conduct. However, the findings of cognitive psychology warn us that jurors
who know the outcome will find it very difficult to assume a foresight
perspective.3 As a result, both psychologists and legal scholars fear that tort
litigation will be systematically unfair to defendants.
In the decade since the pro-plaintiff implications of this research data have
been understood, several proposals have been made for minimizing the
impact of the biases on jury verdicts. A few commentators have
recommended that the risk of bias be minimized by bifurcating the
adjudication of liability and damages. Psychologist Hal Arkes and law
professor Cindy Schipani even considered replacement of the traditional tort
standard of reasonable care with a good faith standard of care similar to the
* Ruth L. Hulston Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. I would like to
thank Gary Schwartz, Russell Korobkin, Jeffrey Rachlinski and Chris Guthrie for their helpful
comments. I am also grateful for the exceptional assistance of Cheryl Poelling and Ashley Ratcliffe
and for the generous financial support of the John K. Hulston and the Charles Rehm Faculty
Research Fellowships.
1. The bias was first described by Fischhoff in 1975. See Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight
Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 (1975).
2. See Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation, 54 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 569, 570 (1988).
3. See Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post - Ex Ante: Determining Liability in
Hindsight, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 90 (1995).
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"business judgment rule" used in corporate law.4 Others have proposed a
clear and convincing burden of proof.5 Jeffrey Rachlinski has advocated,
among other things, that the task of setting the tort standard of reasonable
care be taken from the jury and be replaced with a standard of care that is
established ex ante, such as compliance with reliable customary norms.6
Most recently, Russell Korobkin and Thomas Ulen have recommended two
other solutions. The first is wider use of strict liability and the second is
broader reliance on prospective administrative safety regulation.7
Liability insurers, manufacturers and other tort defendants will welcome
these scholarly recommendations for tort reform. They are especially likely
to favor greater deference to ex ante "state of the art" industry norms and
broader statutory preemption of tort liability in favor of administrative
compliance.
Lawmakers should respond cautiously to these requests for reform.
There are three important reasons for resisting the temptation to adopt
reforms that, while elegant in theory, are likely to significantly favor tort
defendants. First, the civil justice system is a complex process that favors
plaintiffs in some respects and defendants in others. The attributes that favor
defendants include juror distrust of plaintiffs' motives, the obstacles that
victims face in bringing their claims to court, and the presence of cognitive
biases that favor defendants, such as anchoring and defensive attribution.
These advantages may already offset any benefit conferred upon plaintiffs by
hindsight bias. In addition, the General Theory of the Second Best informs
us that fixing imperfections that favor plaintiffs while tolerating those that
favor defendants can actually make the overall situation worse, rather than
better.
Second, the litigation process differs from experimental studies in several
important respects. Actual jury trials have higher stakes, more robust facts,
individual accountability, and group deliberations. In addition, judges and
defense counsel have tools for disarming pro-plaintiff biases. Although no
single aspect of the jury trial process is likely to eliminate the hindsight
biases altogether, its combination of attributes could significantly weaken the
4. See Hal R. Arkes & Cindy Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. The Business Judgment
Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587, 630 (1994). They ultimately decided
against this step and recommended bifurcation, instead. See id. at 637-38.
5. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471, 1529-32 (1998).
6. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U.
CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998); see also Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 3.
7. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics 51-53 (Mar. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
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influence of the hindsight biases. Until the impact of these differences
between experimental studies and trials have been investigated further,
lawmakers should refrain from enacting one-sided reforms.
Third, a number of relatively even-handed reforms should be tested
before resorting to defense-oriented reforms such as deference to custom or
administrative preemption. These strategies include bifurcating the trial of
liability and damages, re-instituting unanimous verdicts, and permitting
jurors to take notes and ask questions. In addition, modest changes in
judicial communication with jurors could possibly reduce the impact of
hindsight bias, including informing the jury early about the burden of proof,
explaining the hindsight bias, and instructing jurors to discuss the facts
before voting.
Collectively, these considerations counsel against prematurely adopting
reforms that would significantly favor defendants. Before such reforms are
enacted, we need far more information than we currently possess about (1)
the power of pro-defendant biases, (2) the transportability of experimental
research findings to actual jury deliberations, and (3) the efficacy of trial-
based debiasing strategies.
I. THE HINDSIGHT BIASES
Conventional decision theory assumes that people make decisions based
on the level of welfare that their actions are expected to produce.8 Under
conventional expected utility analysis, these estimates are calculated
efficiently, making the best use of the information available.9 However,
cognitive psychologists have identified a number of heuristics or biases that
lead individuals to make decisions that would not have been predicted by
conventional decision theory.' ° These heuristics provide cognitive shortcuts
to help solve complex problems." Although they can be useful, they can
also lead to systematic errors.12
Two of these heuristics, hindsight bias and outcome bias, distort
judgments that individuals make in hindsight. They induce individuals both
8. See Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk
Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 750 (1990).
9. See id.
10. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of
Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453-54 (1981).
11. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124 (1974) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Heuristics & Biases].
12. See id.
31:1277 1279
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to overestimate the predictability of bad outcomes and to judge conduct more
harshly in hindsight.
A. Hindsight Bias
Hindsight bias causes people who know the outcome of an event to
overestimate the likelihood that they would have predicted that outcome had
they been asked to do so beforehand. 3 In the words of two pioneers in the
field, Paul Slovic and Baruch Fischhoff, people "exaggerate the
predictability of reported outcomes." 14  In his review of the literature,
Rachlinski estimated that the hindsight bias gives a fifteen percent boost to
the perceived probability of an occurrence." Hindsight bias has been
observed in many settings, 6 including politics,17 historical judgment,18 and
medical diagnoses."
In a 1988 study, for example, Neal Dawson and his colleagues provided
physicians and medical students with information about four medical cases.2'
Some of the physicians were told the correct diagnosis and some were not.
Those who were not told the correct diagnosis were asked to rank five
possible diagnoses on the basis of probability and to assign a probability to
each. Those who had been told the correct diagnosis were asked to stand in
the shoes of the original treating physician and rank the probabilities "the
way you would have if you had been making the initial differential diagnosis
• ..with all information except the pathologist's final diagnostic report."2
Only 30% of the subjects who did not know the ultimate diagnosis ranked the
13. See Arkes & Schipani, supra note 4, at 588.
14. Paul Slovic & Baruch Fischhoff, On the Psychology of Experimental Surprises, 3 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 544, 544 (1977).
15. See Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 606.
16. See Hal R. Arkes et al., Eliminating the Hindsight Bias, 73 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 305,
305 (1988) [hereinafter Arkes et al., Eliminating the Hindsight Bias].
17. See Mark R. Leary, Hindsight Distortion and the 1980 Presidential Election, 8
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 257, 261-62 (1982).
18. See Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Reflections on Historical
Judgment, in NEW DIRECTIONS FOR METHODOLOGY OF SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE:
FALLIBLE JUDGMENT IN BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 79, 82 (Richard A. Shweder & Donald W. Fiske
eds., 1980).
19. See Arkes et al., Eliminating the Hindsight Bias, supra note 16, at 305; Hal R. Arkes et
al., Hindsight Bias Among Physicians Weighing the Likelihood of Diagnoses, 66 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 252, 252 (1981) [hereinafter Arkes et al., Hindsight Bias Among Physicians].
20. See Neal V. Dawson et al., Hindsight Bias: An Impediment to Accurate Probability
Estimation in Clinicopathologic Conferences, 8 MED. DECISION MAKING 259, 259-64 (1988).
21. Id. at 260.
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correct diagnosis first, while 50% of the hindsight subjects did. 22 Thus, the
subjects who knew the outcome post hoc overestimated its predictability ex
ante.
In another study, Susan and Gary LaBine explored whether knowledge of
a bad outcome would skew judgments about the reasonableness of measures
taken by psychologists to prevent harm by potentially violent patients.23 All
subjects were asked to read clinical case scenarios involving the treatment of
potentially violent patients. Some were told that the patient actually became
violent. Others were either told nothing about the outcome or they were told
that the patient caused no harm. Those who had been told of a violent
outcome rated the violence as more foreseeable than either of the other two
groups.24 Once an outcome is known, the researchers concluded, it is hard
to reconstruct the prior state of mind in which the outcome is unknown.'
The implications for tort liability are obvious. The LaBines cite the case
of Davis v. Lhim,26 as an example.2 In that case, a patient fatally shot his
mother when she tried to prevent him from firing a shotgun in his aunt's
home. 28 The mother's estate contended that she was a foreseeable victim of
negligence by her son's psychiatrist.29 Yet, the only evidence of any threat to
her was a single note made during an emergency room visit two years
earlier, stating only that her son "keeps threatening his mother for money.""
The court concluded that she was a foreseeable victim. Hindsight, the
LaBines suggest, may have colored this judgment.3
The influence of hindsight bias is not limited to judgments about
foreseeability. Hindsight bias can also skew post hoc judgments about the
reasonability of prior conduct. Because the hindsight bias makes bad
outcomes seem more predictable than they really were at the time, it can lead
hindsight evaluators to assume that reasonable persons would have taken
more precautions than the defendant did. Many studies have demonstrated
that evaluative judgments are linked to assessments of foreseeability.3 2
22. See id. at 261.
23. See Susan J. LaBine & Gary LaBine, Determinations of Negligence and the Hindsight
Bias, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 501, 507-08 (1996). The study was prompted by concern over
Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
24. See id. at 509-10.
25. See id. at 503.
26. 335 N.W.2d 481 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
27. See LaBine & LaBine, supra note 23, at 503.
28. See Davis, 335 N.W.2d at 484.
29. See id.
30. Id. at 490.
31. See LaBine & LaBine, supra note 23, at 503.
32. See, e.g., D. Jordan Lowe & Philip M.J. Reckers, The Effects of Hindsight Bias on
Jurors' Evaluations of Auditor Decisions, 25 DECISION SCI. 401, 403 (reviewing the literature).
31:1277 1281
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Individuals who know the outcome of a decision not only overestimate the
predictability of bad outcomes, but also are more likely to evaluate the
decision negatively. As a consequence, hindsight bias may lead jurors to
mistakenly conclude not only that the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the
defendant's conduct, thus establishing proximate cause, but also that the
defendant should have take greater precautions to avoid this foreseeable
danger, thus establishing the defendant's negligence.
B. Outcome Bias
Knowledge of bad outcomes also has a second independent heuristic
effect. When people know that things turned out badly, they are more likely
to believe that someone was careless."3 This heuristic is called the outcome
bias.34 Mitchell and Kalb found, for example, that nurse supervisors who
know about a bad outcome are more likely to review a nurse negatively than
supervisors who do not know about a bad outcome. Similarly, a study by
Anderson found that clinical psychology students evaluate the clinical
36judgments of doctors more harshly when informed of a bad outcome.
This bias is independent of the hindsight bias, although both can cause
unfair evaluative judgments.37 Hindsight bias distorts post hoc evaluative
judgments by inflating the foreseeability of bad outcomes. Outcome bias
distorts hindsight judgments by associating bad outcomes with bad decisions.
Outcome bias, consequently, appears even when subjects are told in advance
the probability of a bad outcome.38
In a famous study by Baron and Hershey, for example, subjects were told
that eight percent of the patients who have a certain heart bypass operation
die from the operation itself. 39 They were then asked to evaluate a surgeon's
decision to go ahead with the surgery. Those subjects who were told that the
33. See, e.g., Baron & Hershey, supra note 2, at 578; Robert A. Caplan et al., Effect of
Outcome on Physician Judgments of Appropriateness of Care, 265 JAMA 1957, 1960 (1991);
Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 581 n.36 (collecting studies on outcome bias); Dan Zakay, The
Evaluation of Managerial Decisions' Quality by Managers, 56 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 49, 52 tbl. 1,
55 (1984) (stating that outcome is the most important indicator of decision quality in the eyes of
professional managers).
34. See Baron & Hershey, supra note 2, at 570.
35. See Terence R. Mitchell & Laura S. Kalb, Effects of Outcome Knowledge and Outcome
Valence on Supervisors' Evaluations, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 604 (1981).
36. See L. Anderson, Is Hindsight a Fair Judge of Foresight: An Experimental Investigation
of Second-Guessing (1986) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Loyola University), cited in Lowe &
Reckers, supra note 32, at 403.
37. See Baron & Hershey, supra note 2, at 570.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 571.
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surgery was successful rated the decision significantly more favorably than
those who were told that it failed.4
In real life, the two biases can work together.4 ' Most researchers have
not attempted to isolate their separate effects and, instead, have simply
studied whether outcome information influences evaluative judgments. For
example, Lowe and Reckers surveyed members of a Phoenix, Arizona jury
pool and asked them about the quality of work performed by auditors in a
hypothetical case.42  The jurors who were given negative outcome
information gave significantly lower evaluations of the auditors'
performance.43 And in a 1996 study, subjects were asked whether a mental
health therapist who had taken some measures to prevent violence by her
patient (like alerting police) should have done more." Subjects who were
told that the patient later committed a violent act were more likely to
conclude that the therapist failed to take reasonable precautions.
Outcome bias appears to be most serious when the victim's injuries are
severe. Although the research findings have been inconsistent, 45 most
conclude that severity is associated with a greater assessment of fault.' In a
study by Caplan, Posner, and Cheney, for example, anesthesiologists were
asked to judge the appropriateness of care in twenty-one cases involving
adverse anesthetic outcomes.47 Some of the subjects were told that the
injuries incurred were permanent and others were told the injuries were
temporary. Judgments of appropriate care decreased by thirty-one percent
when the subjects were told that the injury was severe. 4' These findings are
40. See id. at 571-72.
41. See id. at 570.
42. See Lowe & Reckers, supra note 32, at 408-11.
43. See id. at 413.
44. See LaBine & LaBine, supra note 23, at 507-08.
45. See Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us About
Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 137, 155-56
(Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
46. See STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM
127 (1995); Caplan et al., supra note 33, at 1957; Neal Feigenson et al., Effect of Blameworthiness
and Outcome Severity on Attributions of Responsibility and Damage Awards in Comparative
Negligence Cases, 21 L. AND HUM. BEHAV. 597, 608 (1997); Mark I. Taragin et al., The Influence
of Standard of Care and Severity of Injury on the Resolution of Medical Malpractice Claims, 117
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 780, 780 (1992); Elaine Walster, "Second Guessing" Important Events,
20 HUM. REL. 239, 247-48 (1967). But cf. Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Variability in
Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the Compensation Fair?, 24 L. & SOC'Y REV. 997, 1018 (1990)
(finding a correlation that was not statistically significant).
47. See Caplan et al., supra note 33, at 1957. Other studies have also shown that experts are
not immune to hindsight bias. See, e.g., Arkes et al., Hindsight Bias Among Physicians, supra note
19, at 253 (studying physicians' judgments).
48. See Caplan et al., supra note 33, at 1959.
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consistent with an important study of bifurcated mock-trials which found that
defendants prevailed more often when liability was determined before
testimony about damages was heard. 49
C. Implications
In negligence litigation, defendants are supposed to be judged by the
reasonableness of their conduct, not by its outcome." Although jurors must
make their evaluation in hindsight, they are asked to put themselves in the
shoes of the defendant at the time of the challenged conduct.5' Because of
the hindsight biases, however, jurors will find it very difficult to do so.52
Unless these biases are neutralized, jurors are likely to conclude that
defendants should have taken more precautions than seemed reasonable at the
time.
Verdicts unduly influenced by these biases will be both unjust and
inefficient. They will be unjust because they will judge the defendant
through the prism of hindsight. 3 And they will be inefficient because they
will encourage more investment in accident avoidance than is warranted by
the genuinely foreseeable risks.54
49. See Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, An Experimental Investigation of
Procedural Issues in Complex Tort Trials, 14 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 269, 281 (1990). Plaintiffs won
less often, but their damages were higher.
50. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).
51. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Fokes, 393 S.E.2d 718, 719 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 37, at 236-37 (5th ed. 1984).
52. See Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 90.
53. Although it is conventional to refer to the difference between foresight and hindsight
assessments of probability as a "hindsight bias," researchers have not tested to see which
assessment is more likely to be accurate. Thus, it is possible that hindsight judgments are closer to
the actual probability of an adverse event than foresight predictions and that the difference in
estimates is caused by a tendency in foresight to underestimate probabilities. See Jolls et al., supra
note 5, at 1525; Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 101; Mark Kelman et al., Decomposing
Hindsight Bias, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 251, 258-61 (1998). If so, hindsight judgments would
provide a more efficient level of deterrence. However, they would hold the defendant to a standard
that would not have appeared appropriate to a reasonable person in the defendant's shoes. See
Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 101.
54. See Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 596-602. Whether it actually causes inefficient behavior
will depend upon the amount of the bias, the costs of the excess precautions and the impact of those
precautions on the probability of an adverse outcome. See id. If the bias is extreme, defendants
will still minimize costs by taking the socially optimal level of care and accepting liability, much
like a strict liability regime.
1284 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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II. DEBIASING RESEARCH
Can these biases be neutralized? Researchers have tried both motivational
and cognitive strategies for reducing or eliminating the hindsight biases.
A. Motivational Strategies
Early efforts to eliminate the hindsight biases focused on relatively simple
steps such as warning the study subjects about hindsight bias and
encouraging them to resist it. These motivational strategies failed. Neither
warnings about the bias nor exhortations to try harder reduced the bias
substantially." Nor did paying subjects a modest amount for correct
56estimates. Researchers hypothesized that exhortations fail because the
biasing process is largely subconscious and automatic.57 Because the subjects
are not aware that their judgments are being distorted, they have great
difficulty reversing the process.58
Nevertheless, more recent debiasing effforts have been more successful.
In a 1993 study by Creyer and Ross, the accuracy of the subjects' probability
assessments was improved when accuracy was important to them. 59  The
authors hypothesized that importance improved effort and that effort reduced
bias. Campbell and Tesser found a similar improvement when accurate
recall was associated with esteem-maintaining 'values such as social
55. See, e.g., Martin F. Davies, Field-Dependence and Hindsight Bias: Output Interference
in the Generation of Reasons, 27 J. RES. PERSONALITY 222, 226 (1993) (stating that giving
instructions to work harder or avoid bias had no effect); Baruch Fischhoff, Perceived
Informativeness of Facts, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE
349, 354-56 (1977) (finding that hindsight bias was unaffected by warnings); Donald Sharpe & John
G. Adair, Reversibility of the Hindsight Bias: Manipulation of Experimental Demands, 56
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 233, 238-42 (1993) (noting that telling
subjects not to be biased had no impact).
56. See Wolfgang Hell et al., Hindsight Bias: An Interaction of Automatic and Motivational
Factors?, 16 MEMORY & COGNITION 533, 538 (1988).
57. See Hal R. Arkes, Costs and Benefits of Judgment Errors: Implications for Debiasing,
110 PSYCHOL. BULL. 486, 493 (1991) [hereinafter Arkes, Costs and Benefits]; Ronnie Janoff-
Bulman et al., Cognitive Biases in Blaming the Victim, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 161,
176 (1985); cf. Roger Ratcliff & Gail McKoon, Automatic and Strategic Priming in Recognition, 20
J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 204, 208 (1981) (finding that the priming effect in item
recognition is largely automatic).
58. As Hal Arkes notes, "motivated subjects will merely perform the suboptimal behavior
with more enthusiasm." Arkes, Costs and Benefits, supra note 57, at 493.
59. See Elizabeth Creyer & William T. Ross, Jr., Hindsight Bias and Inferences in Choice:
The Mediating Effect of Cognitive Effort, 55 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 61, 71-75 (1993). Hawkins and Hastie also report that "a highly motivated subject will
show diminished hindsight effects." Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments
of Past Events After the Outcomes Are Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 311, 316 (1990).
31:1277 1285
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desirability and ego involvement. 60 When accurate judgments are important
to the subjects, they can reduce the bias caused by knowledge of the
outcome.
The most promising evidence that motivational strategies can succeed was
found by Stallard and Worthington. In their 1998 study, they found that
appeals to justice can nearly eliminate the hindsight biases. This study
incorporated a debiasing strategy within the defendant's closing argument. 6,
First, defense counsel reminded the mock jurors that the plaintiff wanted
them to be a "Monday-morning quarterback."62 Second, defense counsel
ended her closing with an appeal not to use hindsight or second-guess the
decisions of the defendants .63 These tactics reduced hindsight bias by over
70%.64
B. Cognitive Strategies
Cognitive processes are believed to be the most powerful sources of
hindsight bias.65 Individuals who are given outcome information are believed
to assimilate it with the limited information that they already know to build a
coherent story.66 When they are given information about a bad outcome,
they "rewrite the story" so that the beginning and middle provide a causal
explanation for what they now know to be the end. 67  Thus, they build a
story from back to front. Thereafter, they view the actual outcome as natural
and find it difficult to see how alternative outcomes could have occurred.61
60. See Jennifer D. Campbell & Abraham Tesser, Motivational Interpretations of Hindsight
Bias: An Individual Difference Analysis, 51 J. PERSONALITY 605, 616 (1983).
61. See Merrie Jo Stallard & Debra L. Worthington, Reducing the Hindsight Bias Utilizing
Attorney Closing Arguments, 22 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 671, 680-81 (1998).
62. Id. at 675.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 679 tbl. 3 (finding that hindsight bias increased assessment of negligence from
29% to 57% and that their debiasing strategy reduced it to 37%, thereby reducing the increase
attributable to hindsight from 28% to 8%). The researchers attributed their success to counteracting
the availability heuristic by making alternative outcomes more available. See id. at 680-81.
65. See e.g., Hawkins & Hastie, supra note 59, at 317, 324; Hell et al., supra note 56, at
533, 537-38; Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 582-86;David Wasserman et al., Hindsight and Causality,
17 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 30, 31 (1991).
66. See Fischhoff, supra note 1, at 297; Lowe & Reckers, supra note 32, at 405.
67. See Lowe & Reckers, supra note 32, at 405-06; David A. Schkade & Lynda M.
Kilbourne, Expectation-Outcome Consistency and Hindsight Bias, 49 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 105, 107 (1991).
68. The availability heuristic may contribute to this effect. That cognitive bias causes people
to assign probabilities based on the ease with which familiar instances come to mind. See Stallard
& Worthington, supra note 61, at 680-8 1; accord Arkes, Costs and Benefits, supra note 57, at 488.
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This cognitive process makes the outcome seem more predictable than it
actually was and can produce unfair judgments about the culpability of the
conduct that gave rise to the outcome.
To prevent this bias, researchers have experimented with debiasing
strategies intended to weaken the causal link prematurely constructed
between the known outcome and the antecedent behavior. In particular,
subjects have been encouraged to seriously consider evidence that other
outcomes were also possible. 9 The goal is to break down the causal link
prematurely constructed and to rebuild new links using the additional
information about other possible outcomes. Ideally, the process will move
individuals from a hindsight to a foresight perspective, i.e., from a
perspective that merely requires the explanation of one outcome to one that
requires consideration of multiple possible outcomes. 70
A study by Lowe and Reckers, for example, attempted to debias
hindsight evaluations of auditor competence. 7' Subjects were informed that a
company had gone into bankruptcy and that its auditors had been sued by
third-parties who relied upon a pre-bankruptcy audit. The quality of that
audit had to be evaluated. Some of the subjects were given alternative
positive outcomes to consider (involving solvency rather than bankruptcy),
asked to estimate the probability that these alternative outcomes could have
occurred, and asked to provide their own alternative outcome. 72  The
researchers found that the subjects exposed to this debiasing strategy
provided "significantly higher evaluations of the auditor's decision. 73
Roughly two-thirds of the hindsight bias was eliminated by this "consider the
opposite" exercise.74
In a study of neuropsychologists, Hal Arkes and his colleagues attempted
to eliminate the hindsight biases by asking subjects to think concretely about
alternative outcomes that could have occurred. 75  The foresight group of
subjects read a case history and were asked to determine the probability of
three different diagnoses. The hindsight group were also told that one of the
The availability of the outcome information may, in hindsight, make other less available outcomes
seem less probable.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 70-84.
70. See Lowe & Reckers, supra note 32, at 406.
71. See id. at 401.
72. See id. at 412.
73. Id. at 414 ('The mean evaluation in the negative outcome condition was 2.97 as
compared to 4.21 and 4.91 for the debiased negative outcome and no outcome conditions,
respectively. ").
74. See id. at 414 tbl. 2 (debiasing reduced the difference between no outcome and negative
outcome evaluations from 1.94 points to .70 points).
75. See Arkes et al., Eliminating the Hindsight Bias, supra note 16, at 305.
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diagnoses was correct. The researchers then tested a debiasing strategy by
asking a fraction of each group to list one piece of evidence from the case
history to support each of the three possible diagnoses. This debiasing
strategy reduced the hindsight effect to a level that was not statistically
significant.76 Arkes believed that this strategy was effective because it
reduced the inappropriate confidence that the subjects would otherwise have
had in the accuracy of their initial responses and, thus, reduced the impact of
the hindsight biases."
Other researchers have also had some success reducing the hindsight
biases by asking subjects to give reasons for the probabilities that they assign
and by asking subjects to consider alternative outcomes.7" Nario and
Branscombe found that explaining one alternative outcome eliminated
hindsight bias entirely and that explaining several alternatives produced
estimates of likelihood even lower than those given by subjects who had no
knowledge of the outcome.79 Similarly, Slovic and Fischhoff decreased the
hindsight bias by informing their subjects of alternative outcomes that could
have occurred and asking them if they would be able to explain those
outcomes.' Davies replicated these results later.8' "Forcing subjects to
76. The number of subjects manifesting hindsight bias was also significantly lower among the
hindsight subjects who were asked to state their reasons than among those who were not. See id. at
307.
77. See id. at 494.
78. See Davies, supra note 55, at 232; Hell et al., supra note 56, at 536-37. The promise of
these debiasing strategies is further evidenced by the success researchers have had using them to
reduce another bias called the overconfidence bias. See Asher Koriat et al., Reasons for
Confidence, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 107, 113 (1980). The
overconfidence bias causes people to place more confidence in their answers than they should. In a
study by Koriat and his colleagues, subjects were given general knowledge questions with two
possible answers. See id. at 109. They chose the answers that they believed to be correct and then
indicated their level of confidence in their answer. See id. at 109. They demonstrated a level of
confidence much greater than their level of accuracy. See id. at 109-14. Another group of subjects
was asked to state reasons why each of the possible answers might be correct before they expressed
their degree of confidence in their answers. See id. at 109. These subjects demonstrated far less
overconfidence than the control group. See id. at 109-12, 113-14. Stephen Hoch replicated these
results five years later. See Stephen J. Hoch, Counterfactual Reasoning and Accuracy in Predicting
Personal Events, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 719, 729
(1985) (finding that Koriat's technique was able to lower overconfidence in forecasts made by
business students). He concluded that accuracy had improved "because the remedial intervention
occurred before the crystallization of feelings of uncertainty." Id. A 1982 study by Fischhoff and
MacGregor, however, was not able to replicate the Koriat results. See Baruch Fischhoff & Don
MacGregor, Subjective Confidence in Forecasts, 1 J. FORECASTING 155, 166 (1982).
79. See Michelle R. Nario & Nyla R. Branscombe, Comparison Processes in Hindsight and
Caused Attribution, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1244, 1249 (1995).
80. See Slovic & Fischhoff, supra note 14, at 548.
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consider the alternative outcomes by explaining or imagining their
occurrence," he concluded, "makes the reported outcome seem relatively
less obvious in hindsight. "2
Juxtaposed against these successful efforts are the findings of another less
encouraging study. In a 1995 study by Kamin and Rachlinski, mock jurors
were warned by the judge of the danger of hindsight and encouraged by the
judge and defense counsel to "think of all the ways" that the accident could
have happened.83 These admonitions had no effect on the bias.'
To summarize, most of the studies indicate that forcing subjects to think
concretely about all possible outcomes reduces the hindsight bias markedly.
This activity primes cognitive processes that would not otherwise be
stimulated and, thus, "new causal skids are greased."' Although more
research will be needed to ascertain precisely how actively the subjects must
participate in the debiasing exercise in order to reduce the bias, the current
findings justify cautious optimism about the debiasing potential of strategies
that actively engage the subjects in a foresight exercise. Motivational
strategies emphasizing the need to reach a fair verdict have promise as well.
III. PREVIOUS PROPOSALS FOR DEBIASING TORT LITIGATION
The danger that jury verdicts will be tainted by hindsight bias has led both
psychologists and law professors to search for ways to reduce the risk of
biased jury verdicts. In 1989, Wexler and Schopp proposed that malpractice
trials be bifurcated so that juries would not hear testimony about the
plaintiffs damages until rendering a verdict on liability.' Five years later,
psychologist Hal Arkes and law professor Cindy Schipani considered, but
ultimately rejected, a proposal that medical malpractice defendants be judged
by a good faith standard similar to the "business judgment rule" used in
corporate law.87 They, too, recommended bifurcation.
81. See Martin F. Davies, Reduction of Hindsight Bias by Restoration of Foresight
Perspective: Effectiveness of Foresight-Encoding and Hindsight-Retrieval Strategies, 40
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 50, 63 (1987).
82. Id. at 61.
83. See Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 94-97.
84. See id. at 98; see also Janoff-Bulman et al., supra note 57, at 161, 169-73 (finding that
requesting subjects to explain a neutral outcome did not reduce victim blaming).
85. Arkes, Costs and Benefits, supra note 57, at 494.
86. See David B. Wexler & Robert F. Schopp, How and When to Correct for Juror Hindsight
Bias in Mental Health Malpractice Litigation: Some Preliminary Observations, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
485, 493-97 (1989). They also propose the use of expert testimony explaining the hindsight bias,
see id. at 490-92, and better jury instructions, see id. at 492.
87. See Arkes & Schipani, supra note 4, at 630.
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The most thoughtful analysis of the hindsight biases was undertaken by
law professor Jeffrey Rachlinski.8 8 After briefly reviewing the research on
debiasing strategies, he concluded that neither motivational nor cognitive
debiasing strategies could eliminate the hindsight bias altogether.8 9 He also
concluded that the cognitive strategies most successfully employed in the
experimental setting, like asking subjects to consider and explain alternative
outcomes, were too intrusive to be used in the courtroom.' ° Although he
considered the possibility that jury instructions might reduce the hindsight
biases, he noted the general failure of similar efforts in experimental
settings. 9' He then examined other procedural debiasing strategies, including
special verdicts, bifurcated trials and allocation of the burden of proof to
plaintiffs.' None of them, he concluded, could eliminate the influence of
hindsight bias.
He was more optimistic, however, about two other strategies: relying on
ex ante norms to set the standard of care and suppressing evidence of
subsequent remedial measures.93 Rachlinski insightfully reasoned that the
problems posed by hindsight biases could possibly be side-stepped if the
defendant's conduct were measured against a benchmark, such as customary
practices, that is established ex ante rather than post hoc.94 A customary
standard of care shifts the jury's focus from a post hoc evaluation of
reasonability to an assessment of compliance with ex ante customs. At least
one court has recognized this potential, explicitly explaining its deference to
custom in medical malpractice cases as a way of avoiding hindsight jury
deliberations.95
Under existing tort law, however, customary practices are not ordinarily
dispositive." As Judge Learned Hand stated in the T.J. Hooper Case, "a
whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available
devices."9 7 Only in the field of professional malpractice is custom the
benchmark of reasonability. 98 By so narrowly confining their reliance on
88. See Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 576-86.
89. See id. at 586-88.
90. See id. at 603.
91. See id. at 603-04.
92. See id. at 604-07. He also considered and rejected a toughening of the burden of proof
as too blunt. See also Jolls et al., supra note 5, at 1532; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 7, at 50-51.
93. See Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 574, 623-24.
94. See id. at 608.
95. See Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 871 (Miss. 1985).
96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A (1965); KEETON ET AL., supra note 51,
§ 33, at 194.
97. 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
98. As the Prosser and Keeton hornbook explains, traditional tort law "gives the medical
profession . . . the privilage, which is usually emphatically denied to other groups, of setting their
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custom, Rachlinski suggests, "the courts have failed to recognize the
limitations of second-guessing an ex ante norm after an adverse event
occurs. 
"99
He then recommends that courts look more broadly for instances in which
to apply customary standards as the legal norm. "The refusal to rely more
heavily on . . custom," he concludes, "presents a lost opportunity to avoid
a biased assessment of liability. ,o
In 1998, Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler suggested two
other possible corrective measures: (1) adopting a clear and convincing
burden of proof, and (2) where possible, asking jurors to evaluate the ex ante
choice facing the defendant without knowing which choice the defendant
actually made.' 0 ' Like other scholars who have examined the possibility of a
heightened burden of proof,0 2 they recognized the risk that a clear and
convincing burden of proof would overcorrect the bias, resulting in
unfairness to plaintiffs. However, they concluded that this prescription
warrants further research.0 3 In addition, they proposed a unique form of
bifurcation in which the defendant's allegedly negligent choice would not be
revealed to the jury until the jury had determined which choice the defendant
should have made. 104
Most recently, Russell Korobkin and Thomas Ulen recommended two
other possible solutions. 5 The first is wider use of strict liability and the
second is broader reliance on prospective administrative safety regulation,
own legal standards of conduct, merely by adopting their own practices." KEETON ET AL., supra
note 51, § 32, at 189 (footnote omitted). However, recent evidence indicates that courts are now
slowly abandoning their deference to medical customs. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise
of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the Millenium, WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming).
99. Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 611. Rachlinski acknowledges that industry customs will
sometimes be a poor proxy for reasonability. See id. at 610-12. Barriers to the development of
efficient customs can include high transaction costs between sellers and the people they injure,
differences in bargaining power, information asymmetries and differing risk preferences. See id.
However, he posits that some industry customs will reflect an efficient level of safety precautions.
He cites medical malpractice law's deference to custom as a favorable example. See id. at 612.
100. Id. at 612-13.
101. Jolls et al., supra note 5, at 1527-32.
102. See, e.g., Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 606; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 7, at 50-51.
103. See Jolls et al., supra note 5, at 1530.
104. See id. at 1527-29. As Korobkin & Ulen note, and Jolls et al. concede, this solution will
only apply in the limited number of cases where the defendant faced a choice between two options,
either of which could have caused damage producing the lawsuit. See Jolls et al., supra note 5, at
1528-29; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 7, at 51. Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler give the example of a
food processing plant which must decide whether or not to treat its wastes with a chemical that
reduces the risk of bacterial infection but increases the risk of cancer. Another example offered is a
physician's choice between two dangerous treatment options. In other settings, they recommend
more traditional bifurcation. See Jolls et al., supra note 5, at 1528-29.
105. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 7, at 51-53.
31:1277 1291
HeinOnline  -- 31 Ariz St. L.J. 1291 1999
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL
presumably preempting subsequent tort litigation.'06 Both would sidestep the
hindsight biases by avoiding post hoc assessments of reasonability.
Over the past ten years, therefore, scholars have proposed a remarkable
and creative array of potential solutions. Some, like bifurcation, seek to
remove or reduce the hindsight biases directly by altering the litigation
process. Others, recognizing the limited success of experimental debiasing
strategies, would change the substantive tests of liability (e.g., increasing the
burden of proof, judging negligence by customary standards or a business
judgment rule, or preempting tort liability altogether .in favor of
administrative safety regulations).
Lawmakers should resist the temptation to act precipitously. In truth, we
know very little about the operation of the hindsight biases in actual trial
settings or even in realistic experimental settings. " What we do know
suggests that the hindsight biases may have less influence in actual jury trials
than in experimental settings. We also know that many of the distinguishing
aspects of actual jury trials have yet to be studied. In addition, a number of
relatively even-handed debiasing strategies, such as earlier jury instructions
and bifurcation, should be explored before one-sided reforms, like deference
to industry customs, are adopted. Furthermore, the civil justice system
already has several characteristics that favor defendants, including fact-finder
skepticism about plaintiff motives and underclaiming by negligently injured
individuals. These factors may offset any advantage conferred upon
plaintiffs by the hindsight biases.
IV. PRO-DEFENDANT BIAsES
The litigation process favors defendants in several important ways. First,
jurors often distrust personal injury plaintiffs and side with defendants,
especially when physicians are sued. Second, cognitive biases can
sometimes favor defendants. Third, defendants benefit from the obstacles
that prevent most negligently injured individuals from filing suit.
Cumulatively, these biases cast doubt on the assumption that the judicial
process unfairly favors plaintiffs.
106. See id.
107. See Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1551, 1572 (1998) (criticizing the Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler proposal for a heightened
burden of proof as based on "such limited evidence"). Posner also notes that any proven pro-
plaintiff bias could be attributable to considerations of "fairness" including distributive beliefs about
compensation by "deep pockets" defendants. See id.
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A. Pro-defendant Sympathies
It is widely believed that plaintiffs benefit from jury sympathies. Yet, an
increasing body of evidence suggests that jurors begin their job favoring tort
defendants and doubting the motives of personal injury plaintiffs, especially
in medical malpractice cases. For example, Ellen L. Leggett has found that
one-third of the potential jurors she has studied believe that malpractice
plaintiffs are "looking for easy money."108 Potential jurors are even more
distrustful of plaintiff lawyers than they are of plaintiffs; two-thirds believe
that plaintiff lawyers are pressuring dissatisfied plaintiffs into filing suit. 9
And many believe that medical malpractice suits are ruining the health care
system by driving up costs.' 10
Neil Vidmar has also found that potential jurors are concerned about
plaintiff motives and about an excess of litigation."' In his study of North
Carolina juries, voir dire often produced remarks that "too many people sue
their doctors" and "it is just going to raise the health insurance rates for the
rest of us."" 2 Like Leggett, he heard jurors voice their distrust of greedy
plaintiff lawyers. Although the jurors who were most explicit with their
attitudes were often excluded from jury duty, the pro-physician biases
survived in more subtle forms, reflected in comments such as "the doctors
were just trying to help his wife and he shows his ingratitude by suing them"
or "too many people are unfair to doctors.""
3
Valerie Hans and William Lofquist found the same anti-plaintiff
skepticism in their study of Delaware jurors who had heard cases involving
tort claims against business defendants. 1 4 Their findings surprised them:
Rather than revealing jurors willing or eager to impose on
business the costs of plaintiffs' injuries, our findings show that
108. Ellen L. Leggett, Identifying Juror Bias and Their Impact on Cases, (last modified Sept.
7, 1999), available in < http://www.jri-inc.com/articles.html >.
109. See id.; see also Edith Greene et al., Jurors' Attitudes About Civil Litigation and the Size
of Damage Awards, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 805, 817 (1991) (finding that most jurors believed
attorneys encouraged people to file frivolous lawsuits).
110. See Leggett, supra note 108.
111. See NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING
THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS
169-71 (1995).
112. Id. at 169.
113. Id.
114. See Valerie P. Hans & William Lofquist, Jurors' Judgments of Business Liability in Tort
Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 L. & SOC'Y REV. 85, 85 (1992)
[hereinafter Hans & Lofquist, Jurors' Judgments]; see also Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist,
Perceptions of Civil Justice: The Litigation Crisis Attitudes of Civil Jurors, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
181, 187 (1994) [hereinafter Hans & Lofquist, Perceptions] (reporting on a larger sample).
129331:1277
HeinOnline  -- 31 Ariz St. L.J. 1293 1999
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL
jurors were suspicious of the legitimacy of plaintiffs' claims and
concerned about the personal and social costs of large jury awards.
• . . [Jiurors were generally favorable toward business, skeptical
more about the profit motives of individual plaintiffs than of
business defendants, and committed to holding down awards. " 5
Four of five jurors surveyed agreed that "[p]eople are too quick to sue"
and that "[t]here are far too many frivolous lawsuits today."' 6 Only a third
felt that "[m]ost people who sue others in court have legitimate
grievances."' 7 Interestingly, the researchers hypothesized that civil jurors
were engaging in a process very similar to the one used to explain the
hindsight biases. In the absence of robust information, jurors were creating
their own stories about how and why the plaintiffs had chosen to sue."'
Public concern about overeagerness to sue has also been documented by
other researchers." 9  Publicity about the tort crisis has apparently made
citizens deeply concerned about excessive litigation and insurance costs."
This concern is associated with lower jury awards.' Perhaps this is why
most plaintiffs in personal injury cases do less well at trial than they would
have done by settling prior to trial.'
Surprisingly, most studies have found that juries are actually tougher on
plaintiffs than judges are. One of these studies found that jurors rule for
plaintiffs far less often than judges do in both product liability and
malpractice cases and slightly less often in automobile accident cases.123
Juries favored plaintiffs more frequently than judges did only in marine and
Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA") cases. 24 In those cases, the
difference was slight. Another study of judge-juror disagreement found
115. Hans & Lofquist, Jurors'Judgments, supra note 114, at 93.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Seeid. at 94.
119. See, e.g., David M. Engel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders and Personal
Injuries in an American Community, 18 L. & SOC'Y REV. 551, 553, 559, 560-61 (1984) (finding
that citizens in a rural Illinois county disapproved of "cashing in" via personal injury lawsuits and
characterized those who did sue as "people looking for the easy buck"). Not all jurors will share
these beliefs. See Hans & Lofquist, Jurors' Judgments, supra note 114, at 96.
120. See Greene et al., supra note 109, at 809; Hans & Lofquist, Perceptions, supra note 114,
at 182; VIDMAR, supra note 111, at 171.
121. See Hans & Lofquist, Jurors' Judgments, supra note 114, at 97; see also Greene et al.,
supra note 109, at 816 (finding that jurors who favored tort reform gave lower awards).
122. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System
Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 7 (1996).
123. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending
Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1137, 1174 (1992).
124. See id. at 1137 (finding that plaintiffs won slightly more often before juries in marine and
FELA cases).
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"judges were considerably more likely to disagree" with jury defense
verdicts (52 % disagreement) than with jury plaintiffs' verdicts (29 %). 125
The implications of these studies on judge-jury concordance are difficult
to assess because the difference in judge-jury win rates could conceivably
have been caused by a selection bias in the routing of cases to different fact-
finders. 126  Nevertheless, the evidence certainly justifies a working
hypothesis that juries are much tougher on plaintiffs than either popular
stereotype or cognitive bias theory would predict.
That hypothesis is also supported by evidence that juries are less harsh
judges of physician negligence than other physicians are. In a 1997
retrospective review of tort cases, Bryan Liang asked anesthesiologists
practicing at an academic medical center to review twelve scenarios based on
actual jury trials. 127 In five of these cases, there was significant disagreement
between the physicians and the actual jury verdict.121 In four of those five
instances, the jury had exonerated a physician whom the reviewers felt had
given medically inappropriate care! 29 Another study of jury verdicts found
that defendants won fifty-eight percent of the cases that had been classified
by the insurance carrier's consultants as "indefensible." 130 In both studies,
jurors were more sympathetic to defendant physicians than other physicians
had been.
B. Cognitive Biases Favoring Defendants
Cognitive psychology tells us that people who start a decisionmaking
process with pro-defendant biases of this kind will find it difficult to abandon
their preconceptions when presented with contrary evidence. This tendency
125. Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve Years, in
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra note 45, at 181, 223; see also Harry Kalven,
Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1065 (1964) (finding that judges disagreed
with plaintiffs verdicts in 10 of 54 cases (18.5%) and with jury defense verdicts in 11 of 46 cases
(21.7%)).
126. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 123, at 1174. For a study comparing jury
verdicts with judges' opinions on the same personal injury trials, see HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 63-65 (1966); Kalven, supra note 125, at 1065. In nearly four out
of five cases (79%), judge and jury agreed, thus disconfirming fears about jury emotionalism or
incompetence. See Kalven, supra note 125, at 1065. In addition, when judge and jury disagreed,
the disagreements were virtually evenly split between plaintiffs and defendants. See id.
127. Bryan A. Liang, Assessing Medical Malpractice Jury Verdicts: A Case Study of an
Anesthesiology Department, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 121, 129, 136 (1997).
128. See id. at 129.
129. See id.
130. Taragin et al., supra note 46, at 781.
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toward inertia is called anchoring.3' Hindsight biases may actually help to
neutralize the unfair advantage that anchoring confers on tort defendants.
Defensive attribution is another anti-plaintiff bias that may operate in
personal injury actions, especially those cases in which the plaintiff is alleged
to have been negligent also. The more severe a victim's injuries, the more
responsibility that observers tend to attribute to that victim. Defensively,
they blame the victim in order to distance themselves from her and to
preserve their belief that they can avoid a similar fate. ' In a recent
experimental study of comparative fault by Feigenson and his colleagues, the
study subjects assigned more fault to plaintiffs as severity increased. 3  As a
result, the defense attribution bias more than offset the hindsight bias. This
finding is consistent with an earlier study finding that hindsight bias increases
the fault assigned to victims of sexual abuse. 134
The subjects in the Feigenson study not only increased the fault assigned
to the plaintiff as severity increased, but they also decreased gross
damages. 135  Thus, they double-discounted the victim's recovery. Double-
discounting was also found in a study by Sloan and Hsieh, 36 where subjects
reduced the plaintiff's recovery more than the percent attributed to the
plaintiff. For each percentage of fault attributed to plaintiff, awards went
down three to five percent. 37 Defensive attribution is therefore a powerful
bias that favors tort defendants.
Defendants will also be helped by the tendency of people to underestimate
the probability of disjunctive events (either/or alternatives). 3  This leads
people to underestimate the odds of failure in complex events. 39  This
tendency will benefit defendants in complicated cases such as those involving
highway design, architecture and medical malpractice. In these cases, juries
may see the conduct of the defendant as less risky than it actually was.
Together, the cognitive biases associated with anchoring, defensive
attribution and disjunctive events have the potential to offset any advantage
conferred upon plaintiffs by hindsight biases. The field of cognitive
psychology is too young to tell us the power that these pro-defendant biases
are likely to have in tort litigation or the outcomes to expect when these
131. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 11, at 1128-30.
132. See Feigenson et al., supra note 46, at 597.
133. See id. at 608.
134. See Janoff-Bulman et al.., supra note 57, at 171-72.
135. See Feigenson et al., supra note 46, at 599-600.
136. See Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 46, at 1024.
137. See id. at 1024.
138. See Tverskey & Kahneman, Heuristics & Biases, supra note 11, at 1129. This is a
product of the anchoring heuristic. See id.
139. See id.
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biases conflict with hindsight biases. It seems unwise, therefore, to confer
significant substantive advantages upon tort defendants until these questions
can be better answered
C. Access Bias
Underclaiming is prevalent in tort law. As a result, tortfeasors receive an
inadequate deterrent signal from the judicial process. The hindsight biases
may help to reduce this deficit. "
Most victims of tortious conduct do not make a claim. The highest
fraction to do so are people hurt by automobile negligence; yet, less than half
of them file claims.' 4' A much smaller percent bring other kinds of
claims. 42 A study by the American Bar Association and the American Bar
Foundation in the 1970s, for example, found that only 20% of the people
who reported tort problems had consulted lawyers about them. 43  A Rand
Corporation study of people's responses to disabling injury found that 81 %
took no action at all.'44
The most compelling evidence of access bias exists in the field of medical
malpractice. The extent of underclaiming here is so vast that the number
would not be credible if not so firmly documented. A California study found
that one in ten negligently injured patients filed a tort claim. 4' Even more
remarkably, only one in six of those who suffered major, permanent injuries
140. See Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L.
REV., 1027, 1042-58 (1990). This subsection is strongly influenced by the work of Gillette and
Krier. They argue that pro-plaintiff biases in the judicial process ("process bias") may be
outweighed by factors that limit access to the courts ("access bias"). See id. at 1044-45. Both
types of bias must be assessed before concluding that the process is unfair to defendants on balance.
See id. at 1045. Consequently, access bias and process bias must be evaluated together, rather than
separately. See id. at 1056.
141. See Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443, 449-
50 (1987); Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 594 n.100. Studies have reported figures from 14% to 66%
for the number of auto accident victims retaining lawyers. See Abel, supra at 448; Rachlinski,
supra note 6, at 594 n. 100.
142. See Abel, supra note 141, at 449-50.
143. See BARBARA A. CURRAN, A.B.A. SPECIAL COMM. TO SURVEY LEGAL NEEDS &
AMERICAN BAR FOUND., THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE FINAL REPORT OF A NATIONAL
SURVEY 135 (1977).
144. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., THE RAND CORP., COMPENSATION FOR
ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES 122 (Rand. No. R-3999-HHS/ICS, 1991).
145. See PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PUBLIC
POLICY 19 (1985); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1183 (1992) (citing CAL. MED.
Ass'N & CAL. HOSP. ASS'N, REPORT ON THE MEDICAL INSURANCE FEASIBILITY STUDY 101 (Don
H. Mills ed., 1977)).
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filed suit.l6 A more recent New York study found only 1 claim for every
7.6 negligent injuries. 47 Furthermore, a third study found that 40% of the
mishaps reported by physicians to their insurers did not lead to claims.' 48 As
Richard Abel puts it, "[v]ictims of injury are reluctant to sue, not
overeager. "14 9
Under these circumstances, the deterrent signal sent to injurers is likely to
be tragically inadequate. Negligent actors will internalize only a fraction of
the costs they impose on others. Fear of hindsight bias could actually help to
offset some of that underdeterrence.
This interaction between the access and hindsight biases illustrates a
phenomenon known in economics as "The General Theory of the Second
Best."150 According to that theory, the elimination or reduction of one
market imperfection (such as hindsight bias) will not necessarily improve
allocative efficiency as long as other imperfections (such as access bias)
remain.'' Because two market imperfections can counteract each other, the
reduction of one can actually reduce efficiency. In tort litigation, for
example, the hindsight biases may partially offset the threat of
underdeterrence posed by access bias. Reducing hindsight bias without
reducing access bias could, therefore, make matters worse, not better.
146. See Saks, supra note 145, at 1183.
147. See PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY,
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 70 tbl. 4.1 (1993). Richard Abel also
reports a 1972 study of two hospitals finding that only one in fifteen significantly injured persons
filed a claim. See Abel, supra note 141, at 448 (citing L. POCINCKI ET AL., REPORT OF
SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, THE INCIDENCE OF IATROGENIC
INJURIES 50-70 app. (DHEW No. OS 7389, 1973)).
148. See WILLIAM B. SCHWARTZ & NEIL K. KOMESAR, THE RAND CORP., DOCTORS,
DAMAGES AND DETERRENCE: AN ECONOMIC VIEW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 12 (Rand No. R-
2340-NIH/RC, 1978) (citing SECRETARY'S COMM'N ON MED. MALPRACTICE, U.S. DEPT. OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, STUDY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS CLOSED IN 1970
(1973)).
149. Abel, supra note 141, at 450 (listing studies that have found social pressures against
suing). Gerald Williams hypothesizes that the wide-spread reluctance of individuals to make formal
complaints is attributable to avoidance. See Gerald R. Williams, Negotiation as a Healing Process,
1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 2-5. He notes that reluctance to sue or make a formal claim has been
documented in the consumer setting by the Better Business Bureau (only 4% take steps to redress
their complaint) and in the context of contract disputes by Stewart Macauley. See id. at 2 & n.4,
(citing BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU, BENEFITS FOR THE BOTTOM LINE: A CUSTOMER RELATIONS
SEMINAR; Stewart Macauley, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
Soc. REV. 55 (1963)).
150. R.G. Lipsey & Kevin Lancaster, The General Theory of the Second Best, 24 REV. ECON.
STUD. 11 (1956-57).
151. See Richard S. Markovits, Second Best Theory and Law & Economics: An Introduction,
73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 3 (1998).
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The Theory of the Second Best reminds us that it is unwise to analyze a
single aspect of the judicial process without an appreciation of the other
factors influencing that process. 2  Overeager campaigns against one
imperfection could be counterproductive. Indeed, the Theory of the Second
Best begs the question of whether any effort at all should be made to reduce
hindsight bias without simultaneous steps to reduce access bias.
V. DEBIASING THE CIVIL JURY TRIAL
There is an additional reason why lawmakers should be wary of debiasing
strategies, like deference to industry customs, that might significantly favor
tort defendants. It is quite possible that jurors are less vulnerable to the
hindsight biases than were subjects in experimental settings. Several
considerations support this hypothesis.
First, jury trials differ from research studies in several material respects.
Jury trials are real and, thus, have more gravity. In addition, jury trials have
richer factual development, greater accountability, and group deliberations.
Each of these differences has the potential to reduce hindsight bias.
Second, judges and defense lawyers have the power to further reduce the
bias. Although passive judicial warnings about the bias are unlikely to have
a substantial effect, other judicial debiasing strategies are more promising.
They include instructing the jurors early about the plaintiffs burden of
proof, advising jurors not to discuss the case prior to its submission,
returning to unanimous verdicts, bifurcating the trial of liability and
damages, permitting jurors to take notes and submit questions, and requiring
juries to discuss the facts of each case before they vote. Defense counsel can
reduce the bias by emphasizing the risk of "Monday morning
quarterbacking" and then offering evidence of alternative causal pathways
through voir dire, opening statement, presentation of witnesses and
summation. They can also introduce evidence of compliance with customary
norms.
Although none of these debiasing mechanisms standing alone is likely to
eliminate the hindsight biases entirely, and few have been tested directly, the
use of several has the potential to reduce the bias enough to raise serious
questions about the wisdom of adopting reforms that could significantly favor
defendants.
152. See Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1027, 1056 (1990).
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A. The Distinguishing Characteristics of Actual Jury Trials
Research studies are not jury trials. The differences may be material.
Jury trials have greater gravity, more robust facts, greater accountability,
and group deliberations. Each of these has the potential to minimize the
presence of hindsight biases. Researchers know that the verbal reports given
by study subjects in response to hypothetical scenarios do not always
accurately reflect the way that these individuals behave in real world
activities. I5 Jury deliberations may be a context in which this difference
between simulation and real life is material.
1. Gravity of the proceedings
Reaching a just verdict will be very important to the jurors. They will be
exercising their civic responsibilities on a matter that directly affects the lives
of their neighbors. In addition, the formality of the courthouse and its
procedures will emphasize the seriousness of the undertaking. Fairness will
matter. Although motivational strategies have had very limited success in the
context of staged experiments, the Creyer-Ross and Campbell-Tesser studies,
described above, suggest that people can reduce their susceptibility to their
biases when it is important enough for them to do so."5 This is consistent
with other studies which have found that "people tend to listen to contrary
evidence and to people unlike themselves when motivation is high to reach a
correct answer or an answer they will need to defend to others."' 55 As a
result, hindsight bias may be easier for defense counsel to counteract in an
actual trial than in an experimental setting. While this possibility should not
be overestimated, it warrants further study.
2. Accountability
Unlike research subjects, jurors are accountable for their decisions. Each
juror's vote will be scrutinized not only by the other jurors, but also by the
153. See Richard A. Winett, Comment, in REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
278, 280-81 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1985).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
155. Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make
Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 30 (1997); see also Russell H. Fazio, Motives for Social
Comparison: The Construction-Validation Distinction, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1683, 1683 (1979) (noting that information comparisons occur more when the judgment is
important); Arie W. Kruglanski & Ofra Mayseless, Motivational Effects in the Social Comparison
of Opinions, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 834, 837 (1987) (finding that persons with a
high fear of invalidity compare their views more with people who disagree).
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judge and often by the juror's family and friends. Jurors also feel
accountable to their communities.' 56 This accountability distinguishes jury
trials from research studies and has the potential to improve jury
decisionmaking.
Significant experimental evidence suggests that people who feel
personally accountable for their decisions put substantially more cognitive
work into their decisions.' 57 Cvetkovitich, for example, concluded that
accountability produced less "intuitive" and more "analytic" modes of
thought.5 8 And Tetlock found that accountability caused his subjects to think
about issues in a "more integratively complex" way. 59
Accountability is most likely to have this effect if the accountable
individual is unaware of the views of the person to whom she is accountable.
The more well-defined the views of the person to whom she is accountable,
the more likely she is simply to shift her position strategically to please her
audience."' ° By contrast, people who are unaware of the position of the
persons to whom they will answer tend to think more deeply about the
decision itself. Under these circumstances, accountability "motivates people
to consider arguments and evidence on both sides of the issue in order to
prepare themselves for a wide variety of possible critical reactions to their
views. "161
An important insight emerges from these findings. Juries are likely to
resist cognitive shortcuts to the extent that they feel accountable to others
with unknown views.' 62 Consequently, courts should continue to admonish
jurors against discussion of the case prior to its submission. The less that
jurors know about the views of the judge, other jurors, and the community,
the less likely they are to choose their position for strategic reasons and the
more likely they are to undertake a complex analysis of the two sides of the
case.
156. See Hans & Lofquist, Jurors' Judgments, supra note 114, at 108-09.
157. See Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability and Complexity of Thought, 45 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 74 (1983) (reviewing the literature).
158. George Cvetkovitch, Cognitive Accommodation, Language, and Social Responsibility, 41
SOC. PSYCHOL. 149, 149-50 (1978) (reviewing the literature).
159. Tetlock, supra note 157, at 81.
160. See id. at 75, 80-82.
161. Id. at 75.
162. See id. at 82.
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3. Robust Facts
The lean set of facts given to most study subjects may enhance the impact
of the hindsight biases. Given a shortage of facts with which study subjects
must make judgments about probabilities or reasonability, researchers have
hypothesized that the subjects may place an undue emphasis on outcome
information. 6 3 At a trial, by contrast, jurors will hear a much richer version
of the facts, including exculpatory evidence from the defendant. The
presentation of that evidence will give the jurors both a reason to rethink
their initial inferences and the information with which to construct multiple
causal pathways."
4. Group Deliberations
Juries deliberate as a group. In the psychological research, by contrast,
subjects have been interviewed individually. Group deliberations have the
potential to reduce the impact of the hindsight biases. 165  Jurors have to
explain their conclusions to their peers during deliberations and have to listen
to the contrary thoughts of other jurors, including alternative theories about
the negligence of the defendants. Thus, the group deliberations that occur in
actual jury trials actively engage individual jurors in a "consider the
opposite" debiasing exercise that resembles the most successful debiasing
experiments.
At the same time, however, research on small group decisions suggests
that these decisions typically reflect the views held by the majority at the
onset of deliberations and that groups are prone to polarization toward
extreme positions. ' 6 This tendency could magnify the impact of the
163. See, e.g., Baron & Hershey, supra note 2, at 578; Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight,
and Punitive Damage Awards: Failures of a Social Science Case for Change, 48 DEPAUL L. REV.
867, 877 (1999); Lowe & Reckers, supra note 32, at 404.
164. Researchers have found that extra information explaining a bad outcome increases the
tendency to inflate estimates of a priori likelihood. See Nario & Branscombe, supra note 79, at
1248-49; Donald C. Pennington, The British Fireman's Strike of 1977/78: An Investigation of
Judgments in Foresight and Hindsight, 20 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 89, 94-95 (1981). They have
also found, however, that extra information explaining alternative outcomes reduces the bias. See
Nario & Branscombe, supra note 79, at 1249.
165. See Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 587 n.76.
166. See Martin F. Kaplan, Discussion Polarization Effects in a Modified Jury Decision
Paradigm: Informational Influences, 40 SOCIOMETRY 262 (1977) (concluding that the polarization
is caused by information received in discussion rather than by conformity); MacCoun, supra note
45, at 160; David G. Myers & Helmut Lamm, The Group Polarization Phenomenon, 83 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 602 (1976) (reviewing the literature); Saks, supra note 155, at 37 (stating that "group
preference tends to be an exaggerated version of the direction toward which individual preferences
were leaning").
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hindsight bias. 67 Fortunately, the data do not substantiate this fear. The few
studies undertaken have found that deliberations by groups of three to five
slightly reduce the hindsight bias. 68 Juries of twelve might do an even better
job of uncovering and testing unwarranted assumptions.
Michael Saks' recent meta-analysis of the existing data on jury size
concludes that "larger juries are more likely than smaller juries to . . . more
accurately recall trial testimony, give more time to deliberation, hang more
often, and appear more likely to reach 'correct' verdicts." 169
Researchers have also found that the deliberative process changes
outcomes in as many as thirty percent of civil cases. 70 Furthermore, group
deliberations materially attenuate other cognitive biases, such as fundamental
attribution error, consensus underutilization, and base-rate fallacy.' 7' As a
result, the jury's group deliberations have a debiasing potential that warrants
serious study.
5. Implications
Jury trials differ from research studies in several material respects. Jury
trials have higher stakes, richer factual development, greater accountability
and group deliberations. Each of these differences has the potential to
reduce hindsight bias.
B. Judicial Debiasing Strategies
Judges have many tools with which to combat the hindsight biases.
Although jury instructions about the biases are unlikely to have a significant
effect standing alone, preliminary research suggests that several other
167. See Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 587 n.76.
168. See Ed Bukszar & Terry Connolly, Hindsight Bias and Strategic Choice: Some Problems
in Learning from Experience, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 628, 631 (1988); Dagmar Stahlberg et al., We
Knew It All Along: Hindsight Bias in Groups, 63 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 46, 55-56 (1995).
169. Saks, supra note 155, at 14 (summarizing Michael J. Saks & Mollie Weighner Marti, A
Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Jury Size, 21 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 451 (1997)); see also Ballew v.
Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
170. See Shari Seidman Diamond, What Jurors Think: Expectations and Reactions of Citizens
Who Serve as Jurors, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra note 45, at 282,
297; cf. Saks, supra note 145, at 1237 n.318 (noting that "[a] group can bring deeper and more
diverse intellectual resources to a conceptually complex task" than a judge can). And they have
discovered that polarization is largely attributable to information learned during deliberations, not
by a desire to conform. See Kaplan, supra note 166, at 262.
171. See Stahlberg et al., supra note 168, at 48 (reviewing the literature).
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debiasing strategies are available. One promising tactic is to explain the
burden of proof earlier in the trial. Another, noted above, is to remind
jurors not to discuss the case until it is submitted to them. In addition,
courts can employ debiasing strategies such as requiring that jurors deliberate
before they vote, bifurcating the trial of liability and damages, permitting
jurors to take notes and ask questions, and insisting upon unanimous
verdicts. In addition, judges could explain the hindsight bias to jurors and
prepare them for defense counsel's explanation of alternative causal
pathways.
1. Warnings About Hindsight Bias
Courts recognize the danger presented by post hoc decisionmaking.'3 As
a result, they regularly employ jury instructions warning juries about it.
Jurors are told that bad outcomes do not imply negligence,' 74 that physicians
do not guarantee good outcomes,175 that negligence is not shown simply
because in hindsight some other course of action would have been better,
176
and, in some states, that a mere error in judgment is not actionable.'"
Regrettably, jury instructions of this kind are likely to have limited
debiasing power. 78 In one famous study by Fischhoff, subjects were warned
that "on previous occasions ... we have found that [people] exaggerate how
much they have known without being told the answer. . . . [P]lease do
everything you can to avoid this bias. " 17  This admonition did not
significantly reduce the hindsight bias.
Even more disappointing are the results obtained by Kamin and
Rachlinski. 18°  They tested the debiasing power of jury instructions in a
mock-trial setting. Subjects sat through an audio-tape and slide show
172. See supra text accompanying note 162.
173. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Fokes, 393 S.E.2d 718, 719 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); Rooney v.
Med. Ctr. Hosp. of Vt., Inc., 649 A.2d 756, 761 (Vt. 1994).
174. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-115(d) (1998) (stating that "injury alone does not
raise a presumption of the defendant's negligence"); McCourt v. Abernathy, 457 S.E.2d 603, 607
(S.C. 1995).
175. See, e.g., Rooney, 649 A.2d at 761.
176. See Holbrook, 393 S.E.2d at 719.
177. See, e.g., Capolino v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 605 N.Y.S.2d 87, 88 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1993); Watson v. Hockett, 727 P.2d 669, 673-74 (Wash. 1986). But cf. Rooney, 649
A.2d at 760 (criticizing these instructions).
178. See supra text accompanying notes 55-64. But see VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR,
JUDGING THE JURY, 126 (1986) (describing studies which found that more intelligible instructions
improved the ability of the jury to disregard improperly submitted evidence).
179. Fischhoff, supra note 55, at 354.
180. See Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 3; supra text accompanying note 84.
1304 [Ariz. St. L.J.
HeinOnline  -- 31 Ariz St. L.J. 1304 1999
HINDSIGHT BIAS & TORT LIABILITY
presentation about a river accident. At the outset of the tape, some subjects
heard the trial judge give the following instruction:
Deciding this case will eventually require you to make a
determination about the probability that a flood like the described
one will occur in any given year. Making such an assessment may
be difficult since the accident has already occurred. When
listening to the evidence, you should consider how the events
which led up to the accident could have turned out differently.' 8 1
After the thirty minute slide show, they were given a final admonishment as
follows:
Making a fair determination of probability may be difficult. As we
all know, hindsight vision is always 20/20. Therefore it is
extremely important that before you determine the probability of
the outcome that did occur, you fully explore all other possible
alternative outcomes which could have occurred. Please take a
moment to think of all the ways in which the event in question may
have happened differently or not at all. '8 2
Despite the fact that these admonitions came from a mock judge, they did not
reduce the hindsight bias.
Still, it is possible that proper jury instructions could have a beneficial
effect when combined with similar efforts by defense counsel. Recall the
success that Stallard and Worthington achieved by having defense counsel
warn mock jurors about 20/20 hindsight.'83 Their success suggests that more
clearly and forcefully worded jury instructions might improve upon the
results obtained by Kamin and Rachlinski. Furthermore, well-crafted jury
instructions could help prime the jury for subsequent debiasing efforts by
defense counsel, thereby making those efforts more effective."
2. The Burden of Proof
In the ordinary tort case, the plaintiff needs to prove her case by a
preponderance of the evidence.18 5 This assignment of the burden of proof to
the plaintiff could theoretically offset some of the advantage conferred upon
181. Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 95.
182. Id. at 97.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 61-64.
184. See Wexler & Schopp, supra note 86, at 492.
185. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmt. a (1965); KEETON ET AL., supra
note 51, § 38, at 239.
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the plaintiff by the hindsight biases. 8 6 However, its impact is likely to be
modest. This burden of proof simply requires that the jury believe the
plaintiff's story rather than the defendant's. As Rachlinski notes, it seems
unlikely that this burden of proof will cause jurors to rethink their decision-
tree in a way necessary to have a sizable impact on the hindsight biases.'87
To offset the biases completely, the plaintiff would have to be assigned an
even higher burden of proof, such as clear and convincing evidence.' 88
However, that change is likely to favor defendants unfairly.
Nevertheless, a modest alteration of existing practices does have genuine
promise. Telling jurors about the burden of proof early in the trial induces
them to take it more seriously. The authors of one study of criminal jury
instructions found that pre-instructions produced more not guilty verdicts.'89
Another study found that pre-instructions doubled the time that the jury
spend discussing the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt. 190 A
third found that juries who had received pre and post-evidence instructions
were "more likely to defer their verdict decisions until after the
[evidence]. ""' The implications for civil trials are obvious, but unstudied.
Judges should begin to experiment with this debiasing tactic.
3. Unanimous Verdicts
Researchers have found that jurors deliberate differently when they know
that their verdict need not be unanimous. Hastie, Penrod and Pennington
found that deliberations were longer and more robust under a unanimity
rule.'" There was more discussion of the evidence and the law, including
more correction of errors and more references to the standard of proof.
186. See Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 605-06.
187. See id. at 606.
188. See id. at 606-07.
189. See Jonathan D. Casper, Restructuring the Traditional Civil Jury: The Effects of Changes
in Composition and Procedures, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra note 45,
at 414, 445, (citing Saul W. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, On the Requirements of Proof:
The Timing of Judicial Instruction and Mock Juror Verdicts, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1877, 1877-87 (1979)).
190. See id. at 445 (citing Reid Hastie, Final Report to National Institute Law Enforcement
and Criminal Justice (1983) (unpublished manuscript, Northwestern University)).
191. Id. at 446 (alteration in original) (quoting from a summary in Daniel H. Margolis et al.,
Jury Comprehension in Complex Cases, 1990 REP. OF THE SPECIAL COMM. OF THE A.B.A.
SECTION. ON LITIG. 617 (1989) (reporting findings presented in Vicki Smith, The Psychological
and Legal Implications of Pretrial Instruction in the Law (1988) (paper presented to Law & Society
Meeting))).
192. See REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 173, 229 (1983).
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Majorities grew more slowly and minority factions participated more.' 93 In
addition, large early majorities were less likely to prevail; with a unanimity
rule, those majorities were more likely to reverse or hang.' 94 Hans and
Vidmar reached a similar conclusion: "[u]nanimity juries were more
thorough in their evaluation of the evidence and the law; [and] jurors in the
minority participated more actively in the discussion." 95 This is precisely
the kind of active deliberation process necessary to reorient jurors to a
foresight perspective. Jurisdictions which have relaxed their unanimity
requirements ought to rethink that decision.' 96
4. Bifurcation of Liability and Damages
In 1989, Wexler and Schopp recommended that trials be bifurcated to
reduce the impact of the hindsight biases.19' Others have subsequently joined
in this advice.' 9 While it is not feasible to hide the existence of an injury
from the jury, it is quite possible to delay proof of damages until a verdict on
liability has been reached. Bifurcation of this kind would not eliminate the
bias, since the jury will be aware that the plaintiff has been injured, but it
might reduce the bias.'99 Delaying evidence of damages may reduce the bias
by minimizing the extent to which the jury learns of the severity of the
plaintiff's injuries. As explained above, 200 most studies have concluded that
the biases are exacerbated by severe injuries.
The hope that bifurcation will reduce bias is consistent with the results of
two studies addressing the implications of bifurcation for trial outcomes.
Zeisel and Callahan reported in 1963 that defense verdicts rose from 34% to
56% when trials were bifurcated.2"1 In addition, a 1992 simulation study by
Horowitz and Bordens also found that plaintiffs won less often when liability
and damages were bifurcated (62.5 % v. 87.5 %).202
193. See id. at 173, 229.
194. See id. at 229.
195. HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 178, at 175; see also MacCoun, supra note 45, at 161.
196. See HASTIE ET AL., supra note 192, at 238.
197. See Wexler & Schopp, supra note 86, at 503.
198. See Arkes & Schipani, supra note 4, at 633; Jolls et al., supra note 5, at 1528-29. But
see Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 605 (concluding that the debiasing potential is limited).
199. See NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY 274 (1995)
(describing a bifurcation proposal).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 45-49.
201. See Hans Zeisel & Thomas Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis,
76 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1612 tbl.3 (1963) (including in the denominator settlements during trial).
202. See Horowitz & Bordens, supra note 49, at 281-85. However, plaintiffs awards were
higher. See id.
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Bifurcation of liability and damages is not yet common in ordinary
negligence actions.2'3 However, it has the potential to make the process
more fair. Consequently, bifurcation is a promising candidate for judicial
experimentation. 204
5. Instructing Jurors to Deliberate Before Voting
As discussed above, 2 5 group deliberations may reduce the impact of the
hindsight biases on jury verdicts. In addition, as discussed below,2'a the
arguments and evidence offered by the defendant will provide both a factual
basis and an impetus for bias-reducing deliberations to occur. The value of
those strategies could be lost if jurors vote on the issues before discussing the
facts of the case. Early voting can lock jurors into positions and reduce the
value of deliberation.2 7 Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that jurors
should be instructed to discuss the evidence before committing themselves to
a position.
6. Juror Note-Taking and Questioning
Several scholars have proposed that jurors be permitted to participate
more actively in the trial by taking notes and submitting questions for
witnesses. 2°8 Although the evidence, thus far, does not indicate that these
reforms improve jury comprehension," they could, nevertheless, reduce
203. See Louis Harris & Assocs., Inc., Judges Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of
State and Federal Trial Judges Who Spend at Least Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69
B.U. L. REV. 731, 744 tbls. 5.2 & 5.4 (1989).
204. See VIDMAR, supra note 199, at 275. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize
bifurcated trials. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b).
205. See supra text accompanying notes 165-71.
206. See infra text accompanying notes 211-25.
207. See HASTIE ET AL., supra note 192, at 230; Diamond, supra note 170, at 298 n.86 (citing
JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 85 (1988)); Lempert, supra note 125, at 220.
208. See, e.g., Stephen A. Saltzburg, Improving the Quality of Jury Decisionmnaking, in
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra note 45, at 341, 358-60; H. Lee Sarokin &
G. Thomas Munsterman, Recent Innovations in Civil Jury Trial Procedures, in VERDICT:
ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra note 45, at 378, 386-88. Jurors are already permitted
to take notes or ask questions in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 39(p), 39(b)(10);
United States v. Riebold, 557 F.2d 697, 706 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Braverman, 522
F.2d 218, 224 (7th Cir. 1975); People v. Whitt, 685 P.2d 1161, 1175 (Cal. 1984). But see
DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512, 516 (4th Cir. 1985) (warning against
juror questioning).
209. See, e.g., Casper, supra note 189, at 444; Sarokin & Munsterman, supra note 208, at
388. However, the value of notes as a refresher has not yet been tested. See Larry Heuer & Steven
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bias. If jurors were equipped with note pads and the opportunity to ask
questions, defense counsel could then ask jurors to identify the different
stories being told and to list the evidence in support of each. If jurors do so,
they will be engaging in a debiasing exercise that is remarkably similar to the
"consider the opposite" strategies used very successfully in experimental
studies. 20
7. Sizing up the Judicial Tools for Reducing Hindsight Bias
Although judicial admonitions to the jury to avoid hindsight bias are
unlikely to be sufficient standing alone, several other judicial debiasing
strategies are available. One rather modest change with surprising potential
is to explain the burden of proof earlier in the trial. Courts have other
options as well, such as explaining the hindsight bias to juries, advising the
jury not to discuss the case until it is submitted to them, requiring that jurors
deliberate before they vote, bifurcating the trial of liability and damages,
permitting jurors to take notes and ask questions, and insisting upon
unanimous verdicts. We currently know very little about the debiasing
potential of these measures, but each of them warrants future study.
C. Debiasing by Defense Counsel
In the American adversary system, the most powerful tools for shaping
the jury's thinking are possessed by counsel for the parties. These tools
include voir dire, opening statement, examination and presentation of
witnesses and closing argument."' Through these tools, defense counsel can
attempt to diffuse the hindsight biases by explaining why the plaintiffs injury
did not seem inevitable at the time and why it would be wrong to assume that
bad outcomes have culpable explanations. By helping the jury to see the
alternatives that seemed possible ex ante and by giving reasons why the
defendant felt her choice was reasonable at the time, defense counsel can
involve the jury in precisely the same debiasing exercises that have proven
Penrod, Increasing Jurors' Participation in Trials: A Field Experiment with Jury Notetaking and
Question Asking, 12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 231, 246 (1998).
210. In addition, providing mock jurors with access to transcripts during their deliberations
materially favored defendants in complex cases. See Martin J. Bourgeois et al., Effects of
Technicality and Access to Trial Transcripts on Verdicts and Information Processing in a Civil
Trial, 19 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 220, 224 (1993).
211. Voir dire is the first place where a defense attorney can frame the issues in the case. She
does so by posing questions such as: "Is there anyone here who thinks that a doctor who faces a
hard choice between two equally promising treatments should be liable if the outcome is bad?"
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successful in experimental settings.2"2 These tactics can help jurors open
multiple causal pathways and, thus, move from an ex post to an ex ante
perspective.
Although only a few studies have addressed these tactical issues,21 3 the
preliminary data is encouraging. In particular, a 1998 study by Merrie Jo
Stallard and Debra Worthington supports the intuition that defense counsel
will have a crucial role to play.214 That study attempted to reduce the
hindsight biases in a mock trial setting by incorporating a debiasing strategy
within the defendant's closing argument. First, defense counsel reminded
the jurors that the plaintiff wanted them to be a "Monday-morning
quarterback."2"5 Second, defense counsel ended her closing argument with
an appeal not to use hindsight or second-guess the decisions of the
defendants.2"6 These tactics reduced the hindsight bias by over seventy
percent.2"7
Other research indirectly supports the hypothesis that carefully phrased
questions from defense counsel during voir dire and effective use of opening
statements can reduce the hindsight biases. Wasserman, Lempert and
Hastie, for example, found that the hindsight effect is virtually eliminated
when a bad outcome is attributed to unforeseeable chance factors, such as an
unanticipated earthquake or storm.2"' When explained this way, the outcome
no longer seems inevitable. In appropriate cases, defense counsel will be
able to make a similar contention in her opening statement. Counsel can
inform the jury, for example, that the plaintiffs complications from back
surgery were a matter of chance rather than inferior care. Providing the jury
with this alternative story should help to reduce the risk that jurors will
prematurely write a story that attributes responsibility to the defendant.
Another promising study by Lynn Hasher and her colleagues determined
that subjects could retrieve their initial perspectives when informed that the
"correct" answer provided to them by the researchers had been an error.219
212. Expert witnesses can also assist in this education of the jury. See Jolls et al., supra note
5, at 1526-27 (describing the successful efforts of one expert witness); Wexler & Schopp, supra
note 86, at 490-92.
213. See Lowe & Reckers, supra note 32, at 418 (debiasing power of judges and attorneys not
yet known).
214. See Stallard & Worthington, supra note 61, at 682.
215. See id. at 675.
216. See id.
217. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
218. See Wasserman et al., supra note 65, at 30.
219. See Lynn Hasher et al., I Knew It All Along: Or, Did ?, 20 J. VERBAL LEARNING &
VERBAL BEHAV. 86, 93 (1981). Other studies have confirmed the ability to recall an original
rating, although the success rates were less complete.
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This information eliminated any hindsight effects attributable to the "correct"
answer previously provided. Hasher and her colleagues' findings indicate
that jurors are able to retrieve their unbiased ex ante viewpointY In the
adversarial context of tort litigation, of course, defense counsel and their
expert witnesses employ a similar strategy by pointing out errors in the
plaintiffs explanation of the case. Although the jury may partially discount
this strategy as partisan, they are, nonetheless, likely to be influenced by this
reminder that the setting is adversarial and that they will hear two distinctly
different causal stories.
Contrasted against these successes are the sobering results of the Kamin
and Rachlinski study which presented subjects with a thirty minute mock-trial
slide show. 221 In that study, defense counsel did a brief cross-examination of
the plaintiff's witnesses and offered their own witnesses.' 2  In closing
arguments, defense attorneys also asked the study subjects both "to imagine
the possibility that the flood had not occurred, and [also] to consider the
waste of hiring a bridge operator 'who would sit in a booth every hour of
every day in the winter to watch for floods.' "223 These efforts did not reduce
the impact of the hindsight bias.
There are a number of possible reasons why the tactics tested by Kamin
and Rachlinski were not successful, including the abbreviated and simulated
nature of the "trial," the absence of voir dire, the lack of powerful evidence
from the defendant's witnesses, the failure to instruct the subjects on the
burden of proof and the lack of group deliberation. Nevertheless, this study
reminds us that we currently know too little about the debiasing potential of
the trial process to offer more than promising hypotheses about the role of
defense counsel. Nor do we know whether good lawyering by plaintiff's
counsel can preserve or even enhance the hindsight biases.224 More research
is badly needed. Still, it seems reasonable to speculate that well-trained
defense counsel can counteract at least some of the hindsight bias by careful
construction of an alternative causal pathway.2z
220. See id. at 94-95.
221. See Kamin & Rachinski, supra note 3, at 94-97.
222. See id. at 96.
223. Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 96. Another study found hindsight bias despite
closing argument, but it did not attempt to discern how much worse the bias would have been
without argument. See Jonathan D. Casper et al., Juror Decision Making, Attitudes, and the
Hindsight Bias, 13 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 291, 294-96 (1989).
224. I am indebted to Jeffrey Rachlinski for this insight.
225. One other study deserves mention. Bourgeois and colleagues found that defense counsel
could materially improve their success by reminding the jury about the plaintiff's burden of proving
deviation from the standard of care and by explaining complex cases in a less technical manner.
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D. Evidence of Customary Practices
There is one final way in which defendants can protect themselves from
hindsight bias. If the defendant has complied with the industry standard of
care, defense counsel can introduce this fact into evidence. To the extent
that customary standards have a debiasing effect (an assumption that has not
yet been tested directly), much of that effect could potentially be achieved by
allowing the jury to hear evidence of customary standards.
A recent study by Bourgeois, Horowitz, and Lee provides evidence that
customary standards can be persuasive.226 In that study, the subjects were
presented with a mock trial of a medical malpractice case.227 Initially, the
jury strongly favored the plaintiff, who asked the counterfactual question "if
only [my doctor] had ordered the mammogram." 28 However, this pro-
plaintiff orientation was eliminated in a later experiment where the defense
attorney informed the jury that a mammogram was not required by applicable
medical standards. 229
Customary standards are likely to be given considerable weight by the
jury unless a good reason for distrusting them is proven. As a result, the
goal of debiasing can be accomplished without adopting ex ante customary
norms as the exclusive standard of care and thus insulating unjustified
customs from scrutiny.
E. Summary of Debiasing Strategies
Several characteristics of real-world jury trials have the potential to dilute
the impact of hindsight biases. These include the gravity of the proceedings,
the accountability of the jury, the robustness of the facts, and the presence of
group deliberations. In addition, judges can enhance the impact of their jury
instructions by reminding the jury early and often about the burden of
persuasion, admonishing them not to discuss the case prior to submission,
and instructing jurors to discuss the facts before voting. Defense counsel,
too, can make efforts to prevent the jury from greasing only one causal
pathway. They can use voir dire, opening statement, expert witnesses,
evidence of customary norms, and closing argument to keep two possibilities
See Bourgeois et al., supra note 210, at 223, 225. They did not, however, specifically explore the
impact on hindsight bias.
226. See MacCoun, supra note 45, at 155 (describing Bourgeois et al., supra note 210, at
220).
227. See id. at 155.
228. Id.
229. See id.
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alive in the minds of the jurors. And judges could better prepare jurors for
the debiasing efforts of defense counsel with explanatory jury instructions.
Courts and legislatures should also consider experimenting with promising
reforms such as re-instituting unanimous verdicts, bifurcating the trial of
liability and damages, and permitting jurors to take notes and submit
questions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The hindsight biases pose a serious obstacle to fair post hoc
decisionmaking. Their impact is insidious and resilient. Efforts to develop
successful debiasing strategies are, therefore, crucial. The scholars who
have brought these cognitive biases to the attention of the legal community
have done us a great service.
In the much-needed search for debiasing strategies, however, lawmakers
should not rush prematurely to cure these hindsight biases by enacting pro-
defendant reforms such as changes in the standard of care. This Article has
suggested three reasons for proceeding more cautiously.
First, the judicial process as a whole and the fact-finding process in
particular are each complex processes that favor plaintiffs in some respects
and defendants in others. Before any decision is made about the manner in
which the hindsight biases should be addressed, lawmakers must take into
consideration the attributes of the judicial process that already favor tort
defendants. For example, many jurors distrust the motives of plaintiffs, few
negligently injured persons file suit and some cognitive biases favor
defendants. Those advantages may already offset any benefit conferred on
plaintiffs by the hindsight biases. In addition, the General Theory of the
Second Best reminds us that fixing some imperfections while tolerating
others can actually make a situation worse, rather than better.
Second, there are good reasons to doubt that actual jurors are as
vulnerable to the hindsight biases as study subjects. Actual jury trials have
higher stakes, more robust facts, individual accountability, and group
deliberations. In addition, judges and defense counsel can help to reduce the
impact of the hindsight biases by encouraging the jurors to consider
alternative causal pathways.
Third, a number of relatively even-handed debiasing reforms can and
should be tested before resorting to defense-oriented reforms like deference
to custom or administrative preemption. These strategies include bifurcating
the trial of liability and damages, re-instituting unanimous verdicts and
permitting jurors to take notes and ask questions. In addition, modest
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changes in judicial communication with jurors could possibly reduce the
biases further, including steps such as reminding the jury early and often
about the burden of proof, explaining the hindsight bias, and admonishing
jurors to discuss the facts before voting. Although the debiasing power of
these strategies has yet to be tested, they possess sufficient potential to justify
judicial experimi'entation. As courts experiment with these measures, they
should encourage the research necessary to determine whether these
debiasing strategies fulfill their promise.
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